A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 

It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961-, Pineda Oliva, David
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/224168
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224168
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Reduccionisme
Psicologia
Causalitat
Reductionism
Psychology
Causation
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spelling  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961-Pineda Oliva, DavidReduccionismePsicologiaCausalitatReductionismPsychologyCausationIt has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations.Springer Verlag2025202520242025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion27 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/224168Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04657-1Synthese, 2024, vol. 204https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04657-1cc-by (c) Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961- et al., 2024http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/2241682026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
title  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
spellingShingle  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961-
Reduccionisme
Psicologia
Causalitat
Reductionism
Psychology
Causation
title_short  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
title_full  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
title_fullStr  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
title_full_unstemmed  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
title_sort  A Non-Causalist Account of the Explanatory Autonomy in the Psychological Sciences 
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961-
Pineda Oliva, David
author Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961-
author_facet Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961-
Pineda Oliva, David
author_role author
author2 Pineda Oliva, David
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Reduccionisme
Psicologia
Causalitat
Reductionism
Psychology
Causation
topic Reduccionisme
Psicologia
Causalitat
Reductionism
Psychology
Causation
description It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2025
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224168
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224168
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04657-1
Synthese, 2024, vol. 204
https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04657-1
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961- et al., 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Díez, José A. (José Antonio), 1961- et al., 2024
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 27 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.811543

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