Farsighted stability for roommate markets

We study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neuman...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Klaus, Bettina, Klijn, Flip, Walzl, Markus
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2011
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/57731
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57731
Access Level:acceso abierto
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spelling Farsighted stability for roommate marketsKlaus, BettinaKlijn, FlipWalzl, MarkusWe study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present a roommate market without a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a roommate market with a nonsingleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2). © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.B. Klaus thanks the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for its support under grant VIDI-452-06-013. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges the support from Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2008–04784), the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006–00016) program, the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009– 01142).Peer ReviewedWiley-Blackwell2012201220112012info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57731reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Inglésinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/577312026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Farsighted stability for roommate markets
title Farsighted stability for roommate markets
spellingShingle Farsighted stability for roommate markets
Klaus, Bettina
title_short Farsighted stability for roommate markets
title_full Farsighted stability for roommate markets
title_fullStr Farsighted stability for roommate markets
title_full_unstemmed Farsighted stability for roommate markets
title_sort Farsighted stability for roommate markets
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
Walzl, Markus
author Klaus, Bettina
author_facet Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
Walzl, Markus
author_role author
author2 Klijn, Flip
Walzl, Markus
author2_role author
author
description We study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present a roommate market without a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a roommate market with a nonsingleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2). © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
2012
2012
2012
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57731
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57731
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley-Blackwell
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley-Blackwell
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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