Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation

A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function determining the maximal gain or minimal cost that every subset of players can achieve when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions that the other players take. The relationships of closeness among the players s...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Fernández García, Julio R., Gallego Sánchez, Inés Magdalena, Jiménez Losada, Andrés, Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel, Andrés Jiménez-Losada (Coordinador)
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Sevilla (US)
Repositorio:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
OAI Identifier:oai:idus.us.es:11441/161630
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/11441/161630
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.029
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:cooperative game, fuzzy relations, proximity relations, Choquet integral, Shapley value, Owen value
Cooperative game
Fuzzy relations
Proximity relations
Choquet integral
Shapley value
Owen value
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repository_id_str
spelling Cooperation among agents with a proximity relationFernández García, Julio R.Gallego Sánchez, Inés MagdalenaJiménez Losada, AndrésOrdóñez Sánchez, ManuelAndrés Jiménez-Losada (Coordinador)cooperative game, fuzzy relations, proximity relations, Choquet integral, Shapley value, Owen valueCooperative gameFuzzy relationsProximity relationsChoquet integralShapley valueOwen valueA cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function determining the maximal gain or minimal cost that every subset of players can achieve when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions that the other players take. The relationships of closeness among the players should modify the bargaining among them and therefore their payoffs. The first models that have studied this closeness used a priori unions or undirected graphs. In the a priori union model a partition of the big coalition is supposed. Each element of the partition represents a group of players with the same interests. The groups negotiate among them to form the grand coalition and later, inside each one, players bargain among them. Now we propose to use proximity relations to represent leveled closeness of the interests among the players and extending the a priori unions model.ElsevierAndrés Jiménez-LosadaMatemática Aplicada IIFQM237: Juegos con Estructuras Combinatorias y de Orden2016info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/11441/161630https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.029reponame:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevillainstname:Universidad de Sevilla (US)InglésECO2013-40755-Phttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.029info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:idus.us.es:11441/1616302026-06-17T12:51:07Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
title Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
spellingShingle Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
Fernández García, Julio R.
cooperative game, fuzzy relations, proximity relations, Choquet integral, Shapley value, Owen value
Cooperative game
Fuzzy relations
Proximity relations
Choquet integral
Shapley value
Owen value
title_short Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
title_full Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
title_fullStr Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
title_full_unstemmed Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
title_sort Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Fernández García, Julio R.
Gallego Sánchez, Inés Magdalena
Jiménez Losada, Andrés
Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel
Andrés Jiménez-Losada (Coordinador)
author Fernández García, Julio R.
author_facet Fernández García, Julio R.
Gallego Sánchez, Inés Magdalena
Jiménez Losada, Andrés
Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel
Andrés Jiménez-Losada (Coordinador)
author_role author
author2 Gallego Sánchez, Inés Magdalena
Jiménez Losada, Andrés
Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel
Andrés Jiménez-Losada (Coordinador)
author2_role author
author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Andrés Jiménez-Losada
Matemática Aplicada II
FQM237: Juegos con Estructuras Combinatorias y de Orden
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv cooperative game, fuzzy relations, proximity relations, Choquet integral, Shapley value, Owen value
Cooperative game
Fuzzy relations
Proximity relations
Choquet integral
Shapley value
Owen value
topic cooperative game, fuzzy relations, proximity relations, Choquet integral, Shapley value, Owen value
Cooperative game
Fuzzy relations
Proximity relations
Choquet integral
Shapley value
Owen value
description A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function determining the maximal gain or minimal cost that every subset of players can achieve when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions that the other players take. The relationships of closeness among the players should modify the bargaining among them and therefore their payoffs. The first models that have studied this closeness used a priori unions or undirected graphs. In the a priori union model a partition of the big coalition is supposed. Each element of the partition represents a group of players with the same interests. The groups negotiate among them to form the grand coalition and later, inside each one, players bargain among them. Now we propose to use proximity relations to represent leveled closeness of the interests among the players and extending the a priori unions model.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/11441/161630
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.029
url https://hdl.handle.net/11441/161630
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.029
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv ECO2013-40755-P
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.029
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
instname:Universidad de Sevilla (US)
instname_str Universidad de Sevilla (US)
reponame_str idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
collection idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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