El maremágnum de las reformas electorales en Italia: una necesaria recapitulación
Italy represents an exceptional case in comparative perspective as far as its electoral system is concerned. Since the restoration of democracy after the Second World War to the present, up to six different electoral laws have been passed for the Cham-ber of Deputies. Moreover, during the so-called...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/694163 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/694163 https://dx.doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rep.187.03 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Electoral reforms Electoral systems Italian Constitutional Court Italian electoral system Italian Parliament Derecho |
| Resumo: | Italy represents an exceptional case in comparative perspective as far as its electoral system is concerned. Since the restoration of democracy after the Second World War to the present, up to six different electoral laws have been passed for the Cham-ber of Deputies. Moreover, during the so-called Second Italian Republic, the country has witnessed four electoral systems: Mattarellum (1993), Porcellum (2005), Italicum (2015) and Rosatellum (2017). This paper aims to summarize the electoral reforms that took place in Italy. Thus, this contribution sheds light on the different types of electoral systems used at the Italian national level and its effects, and discusses what have been the most relevant characteristics of their reform processes as well. The main conclusions highlight that the electoral reform processes have been different from each other, fitting one of them in the elite-mass interaction type and others in the elite-majority imposition one. In addition, against what had been usual in this issue, this paper stress the crucial role played by the Italian Constitutional Court as the main triggering actor of electoral reforms in its judgments 1/2014 and 35/2017. |
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