Morality without mindreading
Can animals behave morally if they can't mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe that mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia |
| Repositorio: | e-spacio. Repositorio Institucional de la UNED |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dnet:espacio_____::4f012e429ee7eb6c189c911f81f383a8 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/32654 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 11 Lógica 7205.02 Filosofía de la lógica |
| Sumario: | Can animals behave morally if they can't mindread? Does morality require mindreading capacities? Moral psychologists believe that mindreading is contingently involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that while the former may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I show that animals with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an identifiable moral content. Therefore, at least one type of moral motivation does not require mindreading. This means that, a priori, non-mindreading animals can be moral. |
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