Conciencia y dualismo
In this paper I present an objection to the Kripke-Chalmers version of the conceivability argument against physicalism. I also assess the prospects of this physicalist response in the light of two further difficulties: the epistemology of modality and the property dualism argument
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2008 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/10735 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/10735 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Dualisme Dualism Consciència Consciousness Materialisme Materialism |
| Sumario: | In this paper I present an objection to the Kripke-Chalmers version of the conceivability argument against physicalism. I also assess the prospects of this physicalist response in the light of two further difficulties: the epistemology of modality and the property dualism argument |
|---|