Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new rand...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Burgos (UBU) |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos (RIUBU) |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/7008 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Best experienced payoff Procedural rationality Payoff-sampling dynamics Stability Matemáticas Economía Mathematics Economics |
| Sumario: | We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria. |
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