Attacking pairing-free attribute-based encryption schemes

Combining several results that have been published in the last years, it is known that it is impossible to design simple and secure attribute-based encryption schemes that work in (classical) settings like the RSA or the pairing-free discrete logarithm ones. The purpose of this article is to broadca...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Herranz Sotoca, Javier|||0000-0001-5141-7234
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Recursos:Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Repositorio:UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/335791
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2117/335791
https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3044143
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Data protection
Computer security
Data encryption (Computer science)
attacks
attribute-based encryption
cryptographic protocols
data security
Protecció de dades
Seguretat informàtica
Criptografia -- Informàtica
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Seguretat informàtica::Criptografia
Descrição
Resumo:Combining several results that have been published in the last years, it is known that it is impossible to design simple and secure attribute-based encryption schemes that work in (classical) settings like the RSA or the pairing-free discrete logarithm ones. The purpose of this article is to broadcast this message through a wide (maybe non-cryptographic) audience, specially now that attribute-based encryption is considered as a useful tool to secure real systems like the Internet of Things. Today, only attribute-based encryption schemes that employ tools like bilinear pairings or lattices can provide some real (and provable) level of security. As an example of the fact that this message is still unknown for many people, we revisit a (maybe non exhaustive) list of articles proposing such insecure attribute-based encryption schemes: we recall which of these schemes have already been attacked and we describe attacks for the other ones.