Hydropower vs. fisheries conservation
New methods have emerged for testing common-pool resource theory in large-scale environmental governance contexts. We aim to contribute to that scholarship by assessing the relevance of Elinor Ostrom's design principles in the lower Mekong basin (LMB). The recent dam-building trend in the LMB h...
| Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2016 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:318948 |
| Online Access: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/318948 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.5751/ES-08105-210103 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Common pool resource theory Fisheries Hydropower Institutional design principles Lower Mekong basin SESMAD Socialecological systems |
| Summary: | New methods have emerged for testing common-pool resource theory in large-scale environmental governance contexts. We aim to contribute to that scholarship by assessing the relevance of Elinor Ostrom's design principles in the lower Mekong basin (LMB). The recent dam-building trend in the LMB has revealed a trade-off between hydropower development and the conservation of migratory fish species. The need to internalize or avoid the negative externalities of hydropower dam construction poses a new challenge to the LMB governance system and its main management body, the Mekong River Commission. Our objective was to explain the emergence of the trade-off and the capacity of the governance system to address it. Elinor Ostrom's design principles and other variables provided by the Socio-ecological Systems Meta-analysis Database were first coded with regard to secondary data and then tested against the capacity for cooperation of the LMB governance system. The lack of sanctioning despite a strong monitoring system, and the existence of fuzzy governance boundaries in the context of a powerful outsider like China, were particularly relevant to understanding the current cooperation stalemate in the basin. Other variables such as scientific knowledge, triggering events, markets, resource spatial heterogeneity, and heterogeneity of interests were also relevant. |
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