Bridging Judicial and Political Arenas: The Political Dynamics of Abstract Judicial Review in Spain
[eng] This dissertation examines the role of abstract constitutional review, focusing on how the political context and the dynamics it generates transform the role of constitutional courts and their influence on the legislative process. Through three interconnected empirical studies, it analyzes the...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/224750 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224750 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/695849 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Tribunals constitucionals Recurs d'inconstitucionalitat Guerra judicial Qüestions polítiques i poder judicial Constitutional courts Judicial review Lawfare Political questions and judicial power |
| Sumario: | [eng] This dissertation examines the role of abstract constitutional review, focusing on how the political context and the dynamics it generates transform the role of constitutional courts and their influence on the legislative process. Through three interconnected empirical studies, it analyzes the bidirectional relationship between judicial behavior and the legislative strategies of political parties, offering new empirical and theoretical perspectives on the judicialization of politics, the dynamics of the separation of powers, and the mutual influence between the political and judicial spheres. The first article demonstrates that judicial polarization in Spain’s Constitutional Court mirrors societal and party-system polarization, with judges’ ideological preferences in-creasingly influencing rulings. Using an original dataset of judicial decisions (1996–2023) and a methodology grounded in Item Response Theory (IRT), the study reveals that judicial interventions in constitutional disputes are shaped by the court’s ideological alignment with governing or opposition parties—a dynamic that fluctuates with the political context. These findings refine theories of judicial behavior and the judicialization of politics by offering a dynamic, context-sensitive perspective. The second article shifts focus to opposition parties, arguing that abstract review, in contexts of intense partisan competition, is instrumentalized for short-term electoral gains. Employing Firth’s logistic regression, the study analyzes whether legal or political incentives better explain the decision to challenge legislation. Results show that opposition parties escalate constitutional litigation during critical electoral periods, prioritizing media visibility and voter mobilization over legal viability. This instrumentalization exacerbates judicial workloads and public perceptions of the politicization of justice. The third article investigates strategic legislative autolimitation, whereby governments preemptively modify legislation to avoid judicial rejection. Combining quantitative metrics of legislative amendments with multivariate regression models, the study reveals that governments strategically moderate bills when facing ideologically hostile courts. This “shadow of judicial review” distorts legislative bargaining, favoring risk aversion over policy innovation. The article contributes to separation of powers theories by empirically validating how judicial constraints alter legislative negotiations—a dynamic previously theorized but rarely tested. Collectively, this research advances two core arguments. First, rising partisan competition transforms abstract review into a political weapon: opposition parties exploit litigation to craft electoral narratives, while judicial appointments and legislative agendas become politicized tools for consolidating power. Second, the court’s effectiveness as a check on power depends asymmetrically on its ideological composition. When aligned with the government, its oversight role becomes symbolic; when favoring the opposition, legislative gridlock and perceptions of judicial overreach emerge. These dynamics destabilize democratic accountability, particularly in contexts of fragmented parliaments and illiberal threats. By integrating judicial politics, legislative strategy, and partisan competition frameworks, this thesis redefines abstract review as a double-edged institution—essential for constitutional governance yet vulnerable to politicization. It underscores the urgent need to acknowledge the erosion of judicial independence and re-imagine how to bolster its democratic legitimacy in an era of growing polarization and institutional distrust. |
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