Compromise Leadership: Competing Board Subgroups and the Appointment of a Newcomer Chair
Prior research suggests that firm-specific human capital is important in enabling board chairs to effectively lead their boards in their oversight duties. Despite this, some boards appoint newcomer directors to the chair position. This paper seeks to explain why. Building on power circulation and fa...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Ramon Llull (URL) |
| Repositório: | DAU Arxiu Digital de la Universitat Ramon Llull |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dnet:dau_________::eb0d8f0eaf81a8dd9d52e13e9881c55f |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/6294 https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063251381323 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Board chair Board of directors Strategic leadership Corporate governance |
| Resumo: | Prior research suggests that firm-specific human capital is important in enabling board chairs to effectively lead their boards in their oversight duties. Despite this, some boards appoint newcomer directors to the chair position. This paper seeks to explain why. Building on power circulation and faultline theories, we posit that boards characterized by strongly divided subgroups with none dominant over the board may have difficulty in agreeing on promoting a director from among their ranks to the chair position, and instead select a board newcomer as a compromise solution. We further argue that this will be moderated by factors that affect either the power dynamics or the degree of contestation on the board. Analyses on a sample of 2,199 board chair appointments at S&P 1500 firms between the years 2001 and 2017 support our hypotheses. |
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