Deliberative judicial review
Strong constitutionalism usually conceives rights as instruments for protecting people. The problem with this conception is that it generates legal alienation, since it views people as passive recipients of protection, which is an exclusive matter for the state and, ultimately, for judicial review....
| Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2025 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10230/71264 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/71264 https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/fed.2025.2 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Deliberative constitutionalism Deliberative democracy Human rights Judicial review Legitimacy |
| Summary: | Strong constitutionalism usually conceives rights as instruments for protecting people. The problem with this conception is that it generates legal alienation, since it views people as passive recipients of protection, which is an exclusive matter for the state and, ultimately, for judicial review. In contrast, deliberative constitutionalism gives people an active role in deliberating about rights, among themselves as well as between them and the state. However, despite the development of deliberative constitutionalism, it is not yet clear what this view of rights requires of judicial review. Accordingly, this contribution to the Federal Law Review¿s symposium issue on deliberative rights theory argues for deliberative judicial review, which is a form of judicial review that, by respecting and promoting democratic deliberation, offers better protection of rights, as well as greater impartiality and legitimacy. In support of this argument, the article first makes explicit that the guide that should orient judicial review is not deference or activism but rather democratic deliberation. Next it states that, from this guide, a form of judicial review should be inferred that is not merely substantial or merely procedural, but rather semiprocedural. It then argues that, notwithstanding contextual turns, weak constitutionalism combined with channels of social dialogue offers a better institutional basis for deliberative judicial review than strong constitutionalism. Lastly, it concludes that deliberative judicial review respects and contributes to articulating rights without legal alienation, i.e. through dialogue among all potentially affected persons. |
|---|