Do member states' permanent representations matter for their bargaining success? Evidence from the EU Council of Ministers
How can differences in Member States (MS) capacities to coordinate European Union (EU) decision-making processes influence their bargaining success? Based on a new dataset collected with Council representatives and policy experts in Brussels, this research shows how informal MS capacities can partly...
| Authors: | , |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2021 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Repository: | Repositorio Digital de la UPF |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/72273 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72273 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1991981 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Bargaining success Council of the EU Informal capabilities Member States Power resources |
| Summary: | How can differences in Member States (MS) capacities to coordinate European Union (EU) decision-making processes influence their bargaining success? Based on a new dataset collected with Council representatives and policy experts in Brussels, this research shows how informal MS capacities can partly shape legislative outcomes in the EU under certain conditions. This research provides evidence that informal capacities, such as the effectiveness of MS permanent representations and/or their capacity to coordinate with other actors in the legislative decision-making, matter for bargaining success. Using a mixed-method design, this research illustrates how both the structure preference allocation and thresholds of formal power are conditions of informal power resource activation. |
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