Cryptanalysis of a Group Key Establishment Protocol
[EN] In this paper, we analyze the security of a group key establishment scheme proposed by López-Ramos et al. This proposal aims at allowing a group of users to agree on a common key. We present several attacks against the security of the proposed protocol. In particular, an active attack is presen...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de León |
| Repositorio: | BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:buleria.unileon.es:10612/19436 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/13/2/332 https://hdl.handle.net/10612/19436 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Informática Cryptanalysis Group key establishment 1203.08 Código y Sistemas de Codificación |
| Sumario: | [EN] In this paper, we analyze the security of a group key establishment scheme proposed by López-Ramos et al. This proposal aims at allowing a group of users to agree on a common key. We present several attacks against the security of the proposed protocol. In particular, an active attack is presented, and it is also proved that the protocol does not provide forward secrecy. |
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