Believers in pseudoscience present lower evidential criteria
Previous studies have proposed that low evidential criteria or proneness to jump to conclusions infuences the formation of paranormal beliefs. We investigated whether the low evidential criteria hypothesis for paranormal beliefs extends to a conceptually distinct type of unwarranted beliefs: those r...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/186263 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/186263 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Pseudociència Creença i dubte Pseudoscience Belief and doubt |
| Sumario: | Previous studies have proposed that low evidential criteria or proneness to jump to conclusions infuences the formation of paranormal beliefs. We investigated whether the low evidential criteria hypothesis for paranormal beliefs extends to a conceptually distinct type of unwarranted beliefs: those related to pseudoscience. We presented individuals varying in their endorsement of pseudoscientifc beliefs with two hypothesis testing tasks. In the beads task, the participants were asked to decide from which of two jars containing diferent proportions of colored beads they were collecting samples. In the mouse trap task, they were asked to guess which rule determined whether a participant-controlled mouse obtained a piece of cheese or was trapped. In both cases, the volunteers were free to decide when to stop collecting evidence before completing the tasks. Our results indicate that, compared to skeptics, individuals presenting stronger endorsement of pseudoscientifc beliefs tend to require less evidence before coming to a conclusion in hypothesis testing situations. |
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