A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references
We consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, division problems with multiple references. We show that the theory of cooperative games is able to provide a single-valued allocation rule for this class of problems. Moreover, this rule can be related with the Talmud rule for th...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2012 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Sevilla (US) |
| Repositorio: | idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:idus.us.es:11441/137913 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/11441/137913 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Division problems Multiple references Cooperative games Talmud rule |
| Sumario: | We consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, division problems with multiple references. We show that the theory of cooperative games is able to provide a single-valued allocation rule for this class of problems. Moreover, this rule can be related with the Talmud rule for the classic division problem, as in Aumann and Maschler (J. Econ. Theory 36, 195–213, 1985). Finally, we establish the consistency and other basic properties of the rule |
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