Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Celentani, Marco, Ganuza, Juan-José
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2002
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/36341
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/36341
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364505439
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Competitive and organized corruption
Institutional response
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spelling Organized vs. competitive corruptionCelentani, MarcoGanuza, Juan-JoséCompetitive and organized corruptionInstitutional responseWe study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighing off the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibility for the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impact on equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption. To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings: (1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individual utility (competitive corruption); (2) An illegal syndicate oversees the corruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way as to maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions and corruption is lower when it is organized than when it is competitive.Marco Celentani acknowledges the financial support of DGES of MEC (Spain) under project PB98-00024 and of MURST (Italy) under project # 9813282901_004. Juan-José Ganuza acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under project BEC2000-1026. We are grateful to the referees for many helpful comments.Springer201920192002info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/36341http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364505439reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésAnnals of Operations Research. 2002 Jan;109(1-4):293-315.© Springer The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364505439info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/363412026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Organized vs. competitive corruption
title Organized vs. competitive corruption
spellingShingle Organized vs. competitive corruption
Celentani, Marco
Competitive and organized corruption
Institutional response
title_short Organized vs. competitive corruption
title_full Organized vs. competitive corruption
title_fullStr Organized vs. competitive corruption
title_full_unstemmed Organized vs. competitive corruption
title_sort Organized vs. competitive corruption
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Celentani, Marco
Ganuza, Juan-José
author Celentani, Marco
author_facet Celentani, Marco
Ganuza, Juan-José
author_role author
author2 Ganuza, Juan-José
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Competitive and organized corruption
Institutional response
topic Competitive and organized corruption
Institutional response
description We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can allow providers to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighing off the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibility for the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impact on equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption. To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings: (1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individual utility (competitive corruption); (2) An illegal syndicate oversees the corruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way as to maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions and corruption is lower when it is organized than when it is competitive.
publishDate 2002
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2002
2019
2019
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/36341
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364505439
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/36341
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364505439
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Annals of Operations Research. 2002 Jan;109(1-4):293-315.
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
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