Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion

El pdf del artículo es el documento de trabajo.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Gerlach, Heiko
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2009
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/46701
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/46701
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Stochastic Market Sharing
Communication
Collusion
Competition policy
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spelling Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusionGerlach, HeikoStochastic Market SharingCommunicationCollusionCompetition policyEl pdf del artículo es el documento de trabajo.This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive private signals of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a substitute for communication in low demand states. Partial communication in high demand states is sufficient to achieve the most collusive, full communication outcome and strictly dominates partial communication in low demand states. Communication in high demand states allows firms to coordinate their pricing, choose the most efficient uninformed price and avoid price wars. I demonstrate that under some conditions consumers are better off with communication among colluding firms.Elsevier201220122009info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://hdl.handle.net/10261/46701reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.006info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/467012026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
title Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
spellingShingle Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
Gerlach, Heiko
Stochastic Market Sharing
Communication
Collusion
Competition policy
title_short Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
title_full Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
title_fullStr Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
title_full_unstemmed Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
title_sort Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gerlach, Heiko
author Gerlach, Heiko
author_facet Gerlach, Heiko
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Stochastic Market Sharing
Communication
Collusion
Competition policy
topic Stochastic Market Sharing
Communication
Collusion
Competition policy
description El pdf del artículo es el documento de trabajo.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009
2012
2012
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/46701
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/46701
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.006
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812455

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