Overlapping political budget cycle
We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches. Using municipal data, we identify cycles independently for the two branches, evaluate the effects of overlaps, and account for general year effects....
| Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2018 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/127321 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/127321 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Eleccions Despesa pública Eleccions locals Elections Public expenditures Local elections |
| Summary: | We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches. Using municipal data, we identify cycles independently for the two branches, evaluate the effects of overlaps, and account for general year effects. We find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor. In the case of coincident elections, we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection. To account for the potential endogeneity of that decision, we apply an IV approach using age and pension eligibility rules. |
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