Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols
Electronic voting presents many challenges due to its multiple security requirements. Some of the challenges are related to guaranteeing voters' privacy and system's transparency, which are hard to satisfy simultaneously. Electronic voting also presents other challenges such as usability,...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/457585 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/457585 https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-111503 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Electronic voting Verifiability Cryptography Zero-knowledge proofs Vot electrònic Verificabilitat Criptografia Proves de coneixement zero Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística 004 51 |
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Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| title |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| spellingShingle |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols Escala Ribas, Alex Electronic voting Verifiability Cryptography Zero-knowledge proofs Vot electrònic Verificabilitat Criptografia Proves de coneixement zero Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística 004 51 |
| title_short |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| title_full |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| title_fullStr |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| title_sort |
Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocols |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Escala Ribas, Alex |
| author |
Escala Ribas, Alex |
| author_facet |
Escala Ribas, Alex |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Morillo Bosch, Paz Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Facultat de Matemàtiques i Estadística |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Electronic voting Verifiability Cryptography Zero-knowledge proofs Vot electrònic Verificabilitat Criptografia Proves de coneixement zero Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística 004 51 |
| topic |
Electronic voting Verifiability Cryptography Zero-knowledge proofs Vot electrònic Verificabilitat Criptografia Proves de coneixement zero Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística 004 51 |
| description |
Electronic voting presents many challenges due to its multiple security requirements. Some of the challenges are related to guaranteeing voters' privacy and system's transparency, which are hard to satisfy simultaneously. Electronic voting also presents other challenges such as usability, particularly from the voter's side. We study two particular problems of electronic voting. Cast-as-intended verifiability comprises those mechanisms which assure the voter that her cast ballot corresponds to her chosen voting options. Current proposals put the verification burden on the voter, something which is undesirable in real-world elections, where both technically skilled and non-skilled voters participate. In this thesis, we introduce the concept of universal cast-as-intended verifiability, which provides mechanisms which allow any entity to check that any ballot corresponds to the voter's selections - without revealing them. We formally define what universal cast-as-intended verifiability is and we give an electronic voting protocol satisfying this property. The other problem we have studied is the problem of invalid votes in electronic elections. Since a common selling point of electronic voting is that it avoids voters inadvertently spoiling their votes, deliberately spoiled ballots appearing in the tallying phase of an electronic election can cause mistrust on the system. Indeed, election stakeholders might think that the system is flawed or that it was exploited somehow. To avoid this situation, we define the concept of vote validatability, which states the electronic voting system should be able to detect spoiled ballots before they are successfully cast. In addition to formally defining this notion, we design an electronic voting protocol satisfying this property. All these security requirements of electronic voting systems are implemented with cryptographic tools. In addition to encryption and signature schemes, another essential primitive for building electronic voting protocols is zero-knowledge proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true without leaking any other information. These zero-knowledge proofs can be used to, for example, prove that the tally of the election was done properly. Recently, Groth and Sahai constructed efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for a wide range of statements including, among others, statements appearing in electronic voting. In this thesis we give two contributions on Groth-Sahai proofs. On the one hand, we give a framework for deriving cryptographic assumptions from which to build secure cryptographic protocols. In particular, we build new Groth-Sahai proofs improving the efficiency of currently known constructions. Independently, we show how the original Groth-Sahai proofs can be extended to be compatible with even more statements, how to improve their out-of-the-box efficiency for many of these statements and how to improve their re-usability efficiency among multiple statements. |
| publishDate |
2017 |
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2017 2017 2017 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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doctoralThesis |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10803/457585 https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-111503 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10803/457585 https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-111503 |
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Inglés |
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Inglés |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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174 p. application/pdf application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya |
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya |
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TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa) reponame:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red instname:CBUC, CESCA |
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CBUC, CESCA |
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TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
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TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
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1869404487632814080 |
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Advanced cryptographic techniques for building verifiable and transparent electronic voting protocolsEscala Ribas, AlexElectronic votingVerifiabilityCryptographyZero-knowledge proofsVot electrònicVerificabilitatCriptografiaProves de coneixement zeroÀrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística00451Electronic voting presents many challenges due to its multiple security requirements. Some of the challenges are related to guaranteeing voters' privacy and system's transparency, which are hard to satisfy simultaneously. Electronic voting also presents other challenges such as usability, particularly from the voter's side. We study two particular problems of electronic voting. Cast-as-intended verifiability comprises those mechanisms which assure the voter that her cast ballot corresponds to her chosen voting options. Current proposals put the verification burden on the voter, something which is undesirable in real-world elections, where both technically skilled and non-skilled voters participate. In this thesis, we introduce the concept of universal cast-as-intended verifiability, which provides mechanisms which allow any entity to check that any ballot corresponds to the voter's selections - without revealing them. We formally define what universal cast-as-intended verifiability is and we give an electronic voting protocol satisfying this property. The other problem we have studied is the problem of invalid votes in electronic elections. Since a common selling point of electronic voting is that it avoids voters inadvertently spoiling their votes, deliberately spoiled ballots appearing in the tallying phase of an electronic election can cause mistrust on the system. Indeed, election stakeholders might think that the system is flawed or that it was exploited somehow. To avoid this situation, we define the concept of vote validatability, which states the electronic voting system should be able to detect spoiled ballots before they are successfully cast. In addition to formally defining this notion, we design an electronic voting protocol satisfying this property. All these security requirements of electronic voting systems are implemented with cryptographic tools. In addition to encryption and signature schemes, another essential primitive for building electronic voting protocols is zero-knowledge proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true without leaking any other information. These zero-knowledge proofs can be used to, for example, prove that the tally of the election was done properly. Recently, Groth and Sahai constructed efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for a wide range of statements including, among others, statements appearing in electronic voting. In this thesis we give two contributions on Groth-Sahai proofs. On the one hand, we give a framework for deriving cryptographic assumptions from which to build secure cryptographic protocols. In particular, we build new Groth-Sahai proofs improving the efficiency of currently known constructions. Independently, we show how the original Groth-Sahai proofs can be extended to be compatible with even more statements, how to improve their out-of-the-box efficiency for many of these statements and how to improve their re-usability efficiency among multiple statements.Els sistemes de vot electrònic presenten molts reptes a causa dels seus múltiples requeriments. Alguns d'aquests reptes estan relacionats amb garantir la privacitat del votant i la transparència del sistema, requisits que són difícils de satisfer al mateix temps. D'altra banda, els sistemes de vot electrònic presenten altres reptes com la usabilitat, sobretot de cara als votants. En aquesta tesi estudiem dos problemes del vot electrònic. La verificabilitat "cast-as-intended" tracta d'obtenir mecanismes que garanteixin al votant que el seu vot correspon a les seves preferències. Les propostes actuals posen la càrrega de la verificació en el votant, cosa que no és desitjable en eleccions del món real, on participen votants amb diferents graus de coneixements tècnics. Nosaltres introduïm el concepte de "universal cast-as-intended verifiability", que proporciona mecanismes per a que qualsevol entitat de l'elecció pugui comprovar que qualsevol vot conté les preferències del votant que l'ha emès - sense revelar el contingut del vot. A banda de definir formalment el concepte de "universal cast-as-intended verifiability" també proposem un protocol de vot electrònic que satisfà aquesta propietat. L'altre problema que hem estudiat és el problema dels vots invàlids en eleccions electròniques. Un dels avantatges del vot electrònic és que permet evitar que els votants emetin vots nuls sense voler. Per això, si durant el recompte de l'elecció apareixen vots nuls construïts intencionadament es pot crear desconfiança en el sistema de vot. Els usuaris del sistema de vot poden pensar que el sistema té forats de seguretat o que ha estat atacat. Per evitar aquesta situació, definim el concepte de "vote validatability", una propietat dels sistemes de vot electrònic que garanteix que els vots nuls es poden identificar en el moment que s'emeten. En aquesta tesi hem definit formalment aquesta propietat i hem dissenyat un protocol que la satisfà. Tots aquests requisits de seguretat dels protocols de vot electrònic s'implementen amb eines criptogràfiques. Les principals eines que s'utilitzen són esquemes de xifrat, esquemes de firma i proves de coneixement zero. Una prova de coneixement zero permet a una entitat convèncer una altra entitat que una sentència és certa sense donar cap altra informació que la certesa de la sentència. Aquestes proves de coneixement zero es poden fer servir, per exemple, per demostrar que el recompte de l'elecció s'ha fet correctament. Recentment, Groth i Sahai han construït proves de coneixement zero que es poden fer servir per un ampli ventall de sentències com per exemple sentències que apareixen en protocols de vot electrònic. En aquesta tesi hem fet dos contribucions sobre les proves de Groth i Sahai. Per una banda donem un marc teòric que permet derivar hipòtesis criptogràfiques per construir protocols criptogràfics. En particular, construïm noves proves de Groth i Sahai millorant l'eficiència de les construccions existents. De manera independent, indiquem com les proves de Groth i Sahai es poden estendre per fer-les compatibles amb un ventall més ampli de sentències, millorem l'eficiència de les proves de Groth i Sahai per moltes d'aquestes sentències i, en particular, quan es fan servir per demostrar múltiples sentències.DOCTORAT EN MATEMÀTICA APLICADA (Pla 2007)Universitat Politècnica de CatalunyaMorillo Bosch, PazUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Facultat de Matemàtiques i Estadística201720172017info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion174 p.application/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10803/457585https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-111503TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)reponame:TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Redinstname:CBUC, CESCAInglésADVERTIMENT. L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi doctoral i la seva utilització ha de respectar els drets de la persona autora. Pot ser utilitzada per a consulta o estudi personal, així com en activitats o materials d'investigació i docència en els termes establerts a l'art. 32 del Text Refós de la Llei de Propietat Intel·lectual (RDL 1/1996). Per altres utilitzacions es requereix l'autorització prèvia i expressa de la persona autora. En qualsevol cas, en la utilització dels seus continguts caldrà indicar de forma clara el nom i cognoms de la persona autora i el títol de la tesi doctoral. No s'autoritza la seva reproducció o altres formes d'explotació efectuades amb finalitats de lucre ni la seva comunicació pública des d'un lloc aliè al servei TDX. Tampoc s'autoritza la presentació del seu contingut en una finestra o marc aliè a TDX (framing). Aquesta reserva de drets afecta tant als continguts de la tesi com als seus resums i índexs.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:www.tdx.cat:10803/4575852026-06-14T12:46:07Z |
| score |
15,300719 |