Femtocell operator entry decision with spectrum bargaining and service competition
This paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a femtocell operator into a mobile communications market where a macrocell operator exists. The analysis is conducted using a game-theory-based model, specifically a threelevel multi leaderfollower game, where different solution concepts are applied: Sh...
| Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2012 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Politècnica de València (UPV) |
| Repository: | RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:riunet.upv.es:10251/37906 |
| Online Access: | https://riunet.upv.es/handle/10251/37906 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Oligopoly Game theory Wireless communications Femtocell INGENIERIA TELEMATICA |
| Summary: | This paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a femtocell operator into a mobile communications market where a macrocell operator exists. The analysis is conducted using a game-theory-based model, specifically a threelevel multi leaderfollower game, where different solution concepts are applied: Shapley value, Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium. It aims to answer the question of which benefit mobile communication users get from the entry of a femtocell operator into the market. The equilibrium is assessed from the point of view of each agent (e.g. profits and utilities), and of the whole (e.g. social welfare). A case for regulatory intervention is made. © 1997-2012 IEEE. |
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