A many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem'
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents'...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repositorio: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/125577 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125577 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Many-to-many Matching Rural hospital theorem Stability |
| Sumario: | © 2014 Elsevier B.V. We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold. |
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