(Pure) logic out of probability
Today, Logic and Probability are mostly seen as independent fields with a separate history and set of foundations. Against this dominating perception, only a very few people (Laplace, Boole, Peirce) have suspected there was some affinity or relation between them. The truth is they have a considerabl...
| Autor: | |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1996 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositorio: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2099/2621 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2099/2621 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Sentential logic Boolean algebra Logical semantics Probabilistic semantics Probability logic Many-valued logics Supervaluation Uncertainty Rational belief Proof theory Lògica matemàtica Probabilitats Classificació AMS::03 Mathematical logic and foundations::03B General logic |
| Sumario: | Today, Logic and Probability are mostly seen as independent fields with a separate history and set of foundations. Against this dominating perception, only a very few people (Laplace, Boole, Peirce) have suspected there was some affinity or relation between them. The truth is they have a considerable common ground which underlies the historical foundation of both disciplines and, in this century, has prompted notable thinkers as Reichenbach [14], Carnap [2] [3] or Popper [12] [13] (and Gaifman [5], Scott & Krauss [21], Fenstad [4], Miller [10] [11], David Lewis [9], Stalnaker [22], Hintikka [7] or Suppes [23]) to consider connection-building treatments of Logic and Probability as desirable. Indeed such a line of thinking can be pursued (this author, for one, attempted it in [15-19]). In so doing, one straightforwardly obtains a logic based on ---as the simple unifying concept--- an additive non-functional truth valuation which, though technically indistinguishable from (axiomatic) Probability, can however be totally ``decontaminated" from parasitical probabilistic interpretations (such as the usual readings of ``event", ``probability" or ``conditioning") and be given instead a strictly logical reading and justification (in terms of ``sentence", ``truth" or ``relativity"). Once some deeply-ingrained reading habits are overcome, the required concepts and formulas flow easily, and the resulting assertion-based sentential calculus becomes a very natural extension of ordinary two-valued reasoning. Furthermore, in the process we get: (a) intuitive geometrical and information-related interpretations of the concepts, (b) a simple theoretical explanation for some poorly justified formulas (intermittently advanced by various authors, some mentioned above),and (c) a semantics ---and a proof theory--- for general assertions that is unproblematically derived and also fully consistent with empirical or ad hoc approximate-reasoning ``Bayesian" formulas found by Artificial Intelligence researchers. |
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