Trade sanctions against Russia: stylized facts
Using a novel comprehensive dataset on sanctions imposed on the exports to Russia after 2022, we document four stylized facts. First, these sanctions covered 33 percent of Russia's pre-2022 imports in value. Second, though most of the sanctions were concentrated in a few high-tech product categ...
| Autores: | , , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10230/71123 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/71123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20251085 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Comerç internacional Sancions (Dret internacional) Rússia -- Relacions exteriors |
| Sumario: | Using a novel comprehensive dataset on sanctions imposed on the exports to Russia after 2022, we document four stylized facts. First, these sanctions covered 33 percent of Russia's pre-2022 imports in value. Second, though most of the sanctions were concentrated in a few high-tech product categories, at least as much import within these categories remained unsanctioned. Third, substantial variation exists in the specific sets of banned products across countries despite coordinating efforts. Fourth, most sanctioning countries have already prohibited most of their pre-2022 exports to Russia, limiting their future ability to impose additional trade sanctions. |
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