'Cogito ergo sum' como conculcación al axioma A
The purpose of this work is to explain how, with the proposition "cogito ergo sum", Descartes contradicts the A axiom from the Theory of knowledge of Leonardo Polo, by accepting the pasivenness of the knowledge and denying it as an operation of knowing an object, in wich the cognizant and...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1996 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/741 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/741 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Sumario: | The purpose of this work is to explain how, with the proposition "cogito ergo sum", Descartes contradicts the A axiom from the Theory of knowledge of Leonardo Polo, by accepting the pasivenness of the knowledge and denying it as an operation of knowing an object, in wich the cognizant and the cognizance are one in act. |
|---|