Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers

A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can acquire different levels of costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to a committee and su...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Gersbach, Hans, Mamageishvili, Akaki, Tejada, Oriol
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/193935
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/193935
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Operacions bancàries
Mercat monetari
Presa de decisions
Comitès
Bank transactions
Money market
Decision making
Committees
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spelling Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfersGersbach, HansMamageishvili, AkakiTejada, OriolOperacions bancàriesMercat monetariPresa de decisionsComitèsBank transactionsMoney marketDecision makingCommitteesA population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can acquire different levels of costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. We show that for a (stable) committee that uses the majority rule to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative and then to minimize aggregate information acquisition costs, its size must be small in absolute terms (if full learning is possible) and small relative to population size (if only partial learning is possible). Yet committees must never be made up of one member, so the tyranny of a single decision-maker can be avoided. Our analysis identifies both the potential and some of the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.Elsevier2022info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/193935Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 136, p. 153-176https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005cc-by (c) Gersbach et al., 2022https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1939352026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
title Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
spellingShingle Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
Gersbach, Hans
Operacions bancàries
Mercat monetari
Presa de decisions
Comitès
Bank transactions
Money market
Decision making
Committees
title_short Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
title_full Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
title_fullStr Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
title_full_unstemmed Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
title_sort Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gersbach, Hans
Mamageishvili, Akaki
Tejada, Oriol
author Gersbach, Hans
author_facet Gersbach, Hans
Mamageishvili, Akaki
Tejada, Oriol
author_role author
author2 Mamageishvili, Akaki
Tejada, Oriol
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Operacions bancàries
Mercat monetari
Presa de decisions
Comitès
Bank transactions
Money market
Decision making
Committees
topic Operacions bancàries
Mercat monetari
Presa de decisions
Comitès
Bank transactions
Money market
Decision making
Committees
description A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can acquire different levels of costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. We show that for a (stable) committee that uses the majority rule to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative and then to minimize aggregate information acquisition costs, its size must be small in absolute terms (if full learning is possible) and small relative to population size (if only partial learning is possible). Yet committees must never be made up of one member, so the tyranny of a single decision-maker can be avoided. Our analysis identifies both the potential and some of the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/193935
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/193935
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 136, p. 153-176
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Gersbach et al., 2022
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Gersbach et al., 2022
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,300719

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