Normative Fiction-Making and the World of the Fiction
In recent work, Kendall Walton has abandoned his very influential account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples allegedly showing that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fi...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/153637 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/153637 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofia Teoria de les ficcions Philosophy Theory of fictions |
| Sumario: | In recent work, Kendall Walton has abandoned his very influential account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples allegedly showing that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. In this article, both in support and further elaboration of a constitutive‐norms speech‐act variation on Walton's account that I have defended previously, I critically discuss his objections. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, I provide additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis‐à‐vis institutional accounts like Walton's and Gricean speech‐act proposals. |
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