The Political Economy of Regional Elite Splits: Origins, Competition, and Consequences
[eng] This dissertation examines the origins and consequences of intra-elite political competition. Specifically, it focuses on elite tensions and its role in the democratization process under electoral autocratic settings. I argue that, beyond economic factors, mobilization resources are decisive t...
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| Formato: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/188224 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/188224 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/675079 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Història econòmica Democratització Elit (Ciències socials) Eleccions Economic history Democratization Elite (Social sciences) Elections |
| Resumo: | [eng] This dissertation examines the origins and consequences of intra-elite political competition. Specifically, it focuses on elite tensions and its role in the democratization process under electoral autocratic settings. I argue that, beyond economic factors, mobilization resources are decisive to understand when certain non-incumbent elites emerge as a new political actor and how they influence political and electoral dynamics. Throughout this thesis, I focus on regional elites—as a representative example of non-incumbent elites—and I explore their influence through the analysis of micro-level historical data in Catalonia in the late 19th and early 20th century. In the three papers of this dissertation, I trace the political genesis of regional elite parties and the impact non-incumbent elites had on democratization dynamics. First, I explore the origins of elite divisions and I focus on the causes behind the formation of a regional elite political party. I argue that it is the combination of economic grievances and mobilization resources in hands of the elites what explains elite divisions along regional lines. By capturing the intensity of an exogenous trade shock and combining this with the presence of local mobilization agents, I show the mechanisms behind elite decisions to split. The results indicate that regional non-incumbent elites chose to support an elite split where they suffered largest economic losses and where these elites could benefit from access to political mobilization resources. The second article delves into the consequences of intra-elite political competition on electoral fraud practices. In electoral autocracies, incumbent elites can easily control bureaucratic resources and engage in tally tampering thus, if non-incumbent elites are to win seats, they need to prevent fraud. I contend that it is in areas where these elites, endowed with mobilization— but also economic—resources, stand for office that electoral fraud becomes less likely. Through qualitative evidence, electoral forensic techniques, and causal inference methods, I show that the presence of non-incumbent elites diminished the extent of electoral fraud. Beyond the influence of intra-elite competition on formal institutions, this paper provides evidence that elite struggles can also influence democratization by shaping informal practices and dynamics. Finally, the third paper examines the impact of technological telecommunication changes on intra-elite political competition dynamics. This study contends that new technologies benefit regional non-incumbent elites, especially in those places where these elites had previous mobilization capacities or where new technologies facilitate the coordination between local elites and regional elite party leaders. A difference-in-differences design confirms that municipalities recently connected to a telephone network saw an increase in the support towards non- incumbent elites and electoral losses for incumbent elites, and this was especially the case in municipalities where local elites were more influential. This study provides new evidence on the importance of technological change and mobilization resources to understand intra-elite competition. Overall, this dissertation highlights that mobilization resources are crucial to explain both the origins and the consequences of intra-elite struggles. This is especially the case when certain elites have an insufficient capacity to mold institutions. A political economy explanation relating economic preferences and political mobilization resources is necessary to understand when elites split, but also to fathom how elite struggles influence political competition and democratization dynamics. |
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