On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments

Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co-players have the opportunity to approve/disapprove a player’s choice, even if that has no consequences on the player’s material payoff. Using a prisoner’s dilemma, we experimentally study the causes of this phenomenon, which seems cru...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: López Pérez, Raúl, Vorsatz, Marc
Tipo de documento: artigo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Data de publicação:2010
País:España
Recursos:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositório:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/375086
Acesso em linha:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375086
Access Level:Acceso aberto
Palavra-chave:Approval
Disapproval
Non-material rewards/sanctions
Social norms
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spelling On approval and disapproval: Theory and experimentsLópez Pérez, RaúlVorsatz, MarcApprovalDisapprovalNon-material rewards/sanctionsSocial normsSocial normsPrior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co-players have the opportunity to approve/disapprove a player’s choice, even if that has no consequences on the player’s material payoff. Using a prisoner’s dilemma, we experimentally study the causes of this phenomenon, which seems crucial to understand compliance with social norms. Our data is consistent with a model based on the assumption that people feel badly if they expect to be disapproved by others. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in line with the following assumptions: (i) people become more aware about the other’s opinion if feedback is available, and (ii) even if the feedback is ex post and has no effect on their ex ante expectations about disapproval, people prefer not to receive negative feedback.Peer reviewedElsevierLópez Pérez, Raúl [0000-0002-8952-8914]202420242010info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/375086reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2010.03.016Noinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/3750862026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
title On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
spellingShingle On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
López Pérez, Raúl
Approval
Disapproval
Non-material rewards/sanctions
Social norms
Social norms
title_short On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
title_full On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
title_fullStr On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
title_full_unstemmed On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
title_sort On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv López Pérez, Raúl
Vorsatz, Marc
author López Pérez, Raúl
author_facet López Pérez, Raúl
Vorsatz, Marc
author_role author
author2 Vorsatz, Marc
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv López Pérez, Raúl [0000-0002-8952-8914]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Approval
Disapproval
Non-material rewards/sanctions
Social norms
Social norms
topic Approval
Disapproval
Non-material rewards/sanctions
Social norms
Social norms
description Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co-players have the opportunity to approve/disapprove a player’s choice, even if that has no consequences on the player’s material payoff. Using a prisoner’s dilemma, we experimentally study the causes of this phenomenon, which seems crucial to understand compliance with social norms. Our data is consistent with a model based on the assumption that people feel badly if they expect to be disapproved by others. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in line with the following assumptions: (i) people become more aware about the other’s opinion if feedback is available, and (ii) even if the feedback is ex post and has no effect on their ex ante expectations about disapproval, people prefer not to receive negative feedback.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375086
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375086
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2010.03.016
No
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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