Group Assertions and Group Lies

[eng] Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to ofer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lac...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Marsili, Neri
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/216478
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
id ES_09d551bbfe2f42924b835cec7e5b97ba
oai_identifier_str oai:recercat.cat:2445/216478
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Group Assertions and Group LiesMarsili, NeriRepresentació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)Negació (Lògica)Knowledge representation (Information theory)Justification (Theory of Knowledge)Negation (Logic)[eng] Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to ofer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s infuential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to defne group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I ofer a defnition that drops condition (i) and signifcantly broadens condition (ii).Springer Science + Business Media2024202420232024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion16 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2023, vol. 42, num.2, p. 369-384https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1cc-by (c) Marsili, Neri, 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/2164782026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Group Assertions and Group Lies
title Group Assertions and Group Lies
spellingShingle Group Assertions and Group Lies
Marsili, Neri
Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
title_short Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_full Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_fullStr Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_full_unstemmed Group Assertions and Group Lies
title_sort Group Assertions and Group Lies
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Marsili, Neri
author Marsili, Neri
author_facet Marsili, Neri
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
topic Representació del coneixement (Teoria de la informació)
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Negació (Lògica)
Knowledge representation (Information theory)
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
Negation (Logic)
description [eng] Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to ofer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s infuential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to defne group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I ofer a defnition that drops condition (i) and signifcantly broadens condition (ii).
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2024
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216478
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1
Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2023, vol. 42, num.2, p. 369-384
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09875-1
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Marsili, Neri, 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Marsili, Neri, 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 16 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Science + Business Media
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Science + Business Media
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869403128776884224
score 15.812429

Similares en LA Referencia