SUVS: Secure Unencrypted Voting Scheme
[EN] In this paper, we propose a light-weight electronic voting protocol. The approach used by our protocol to conceal the ballots does not imply encryption, and guarantees the privacy of the direction of the vote unless all the contestants (parties) agree to do so. Our method is based on the divisi...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Politècnica de València (UPV) |
| Repositorio: | RiuNet. Repositorio Institucional de la Universitat Politécnica de Valéncia |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:riunet.upv.es:10251/194682 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://riunet.upv.es/handle/10251/194682 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Electronic Vote Blind Signatures Interpolation Perfect Secrecy Post-Quantum Cryptography LENGUAJES Y SISTEMAS INFORMATICOS |
| Sumario: | [EN] In this paper, we propose a light-weight electronic voting protocol. The approach used by our protocol to conceal the ballots does not imply encryption, and guarantees the privacy of the direction of the vote unless all the contestants (parties) agree to do so. Our method is based on the division of the ballot into different pieces of information, which separately reveal no information at all, and that can be latter aggregated to recover the original vote. We show that, despite its simplicity, this scheme is powerful, it does not sacrifice any of the security properties demanded in a formal electronic voting protocol, and, furthermore, even in post-quantum scenarios, neither the casted votes can be tampered with, nor the identity of any elector can be linked with the direction of her vote. |
|---|