The moral dimension of pre-reflective self-awareness
Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental prec...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia |
| Repositorio: | e-spacio (DSpace). Repositorio Institucional de la UNED |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dnet:e-spacio(ds_::8b4aa24d0f3e607156820fbe0495e5b5 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/32701 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 11 Lógica 72 Filosofía |
| Sumario: | Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood. |
|---|