Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory

Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Piolatto, Amedeo, Trotin, Gwenola
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/108982
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
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spelling Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theoryPiolatto, AmedeoTrotin, GwenolaFrau fiscalFrau de lleiImpostos sobre la rendaPerspectivaControl de gestióTax evasionEvasion of the lawIncome taxPerspectiveManagement auditProspect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUTWiley2016info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12143Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 18, num. 1, p. 29-41https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12143(c) Wiley, 2016info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1089822026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
spellingShingle Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
Piolatto, Amedeo
Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
title_short Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_full Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_fullStr Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_full_unstemmed Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_sort Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Piolatto, Amedeo
Trotin, Gwenola
author Piolatto, Amedeo
author_facet Piolatto, Amedeo
Trotin, Gwenola
author_role author
author2 Trotin, Gwenola
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
topic Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
description Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12143
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 18, num. 1, p. 29-41
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12143
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Wiley, 2016
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Wiley, 2016
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.300724

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