Electoral competition through issue selection

© 2014, Midwest Political Science Association. Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the voters' true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as to manipul...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Aragonés, Enriqueta, Castanheira, Micael, Giani, Marco
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/112201
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/112201
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:jel:D72
id ES_070fecabe2def8040ca95ca2c042479c
oai_identifier_str oai:digital.csic.es:10261/112201
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Electoral competition through issue selectionAragonés, EnriquetaCastanheira, MicaelGiani, Marcojel:D72© 2014, Midwest Political Science Association. Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the voters' true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as to manipulate voters' priorities. This phenomenon, known as priming, may allow parties to underinvest in solving the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (a) invest in policy quality to increase the value of their platform and (b) choose a communication strategy to prime voters. We identify novel feedback between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can constrain parties to invest more resources in all issues. We also identify the conditions under which parties prefer to focus on their >historical issues> or to engage in >issue stealing.>Peer ReviewedBlackwell Publishing2015201520152015info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/112201reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Ingléshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12120info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1122012026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Electoral competition through issue selection
title Electoral competition through issue selection
spellingShingle Electoral competition through issue selection
Aragonés, Enriqueta
jel:D72
title_short Electoral competition through issue selection
title_full Electoral competition through issue selection
title_fullStr Electoral competition through issue selection
title_full_unstemmed Electoral competition through issue selection
title_sort Electoral competition through issue selection
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Aragonés, Enriqueta
Castanheira, Micael
Giani, Marco
author Aragonés, Enriqueta
author_facet Aragonés, Enriqueta
Castanheira, Micael
Giani, Marco
author_role author
author2 Castanheira, Micael
Giani, Marco
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv jel:D72
topic jel:D72
description © 2014, Midwest Political Science Association. Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the voters' true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as to manipulate voters' priorities. This phenomenon, known as priming, may allow parties to underinvest in solving the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (a) invest in policy quality to increase the value of their platform and (b) choose a communication strategy to prime voters. We identify novel feedback between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can constrain parties to invest more resources in all issues. We also identify the conditions under which parties prefer to focus on their >historical issues> or to engage in >issue stealing.>
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015
2015
2015
2015
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/112201
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/112201
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12120
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Blackwell Publishing
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Blackwell Publishing
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869402955938004992
score 15,812429

Similares en LA Referencia