Privatisation and Vertical Integration under a Mixed Duopoly
[EN] This paper analyses the privatisation of public firms when private firms may be vertically in- tegrated with their suppliers. We consider a mixed duopoly with a vertically integrated public firm. The private firm bargains the price of the input with its supplier if they are not vertically integ...
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad del País Vasco |
| Repositorio: | Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/63855 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/10810/63855 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | privatisation vertical integration mixed duopoly |
| Resumo: | [EN] This paper analyses the privatisation of public firms when private firms may be vertically in- tegrated with their suppliers. We consider a mixed duopoly with a vertically integrated public firm. The private firm bargains the price of the input with its supplier if they are not vertically integrated. We find that for a given bargaining power of the private firm, it vertically integrates with its supplier if goods are weak substitutes. We also find that there is less vertical integration in the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly. Finally, in general, the public firm is privatised when goods are close substitutes and the bargaining power of the private firm is low enough. |
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