Multi-criteria minimum cost spanning tree games
The minimum cost spanning tree game (mcst-game) is a well-known model within operations research games that has been widely studied in the literature. In this paper we introduce the multi-criteria version of the mcst-game as a set-valued TU-game. We prove that the extension of Bird's cost alloc...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión enviada para evaluación y publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2004 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Sevilla (US) |
| Repositorio: | idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:idus.us.es:11441/26028 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11441/26028 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.06.013 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Cooperative game theory Multi-criteria optimization Minimum cost spanning tree |
| Sumario: | The minimum cost spanning tree game (mcst-game) is a well-known model within operations research games that has been widely studied in the literature. In this paper we introduce the multi-criteria version of the mcst-game as a set-valued TU-game. We prove that the extension of Bird's cost allocation rule provides dominance core elements in this game. We also give a family of core solutions that are different from the previous one; these solutions are based on proportional allocations obtained using scalar solutions of the multi-criteria spanning tree problem. Besides, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that the preference core of this game is not empty. |
|---|