Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly stu...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1997 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:143269 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143269 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2291 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Jocs, Teoria de Matching model |
| Sumario: | In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution. |
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