On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites
[eng] In this dissertation I examine some of the most relevant proposals of common solutions to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do that, I present first a definition of what a paradox is so that, with this at hand, I can characterize in detail what should we expect from a common solu...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/106661 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106661 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399925 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Paradoxa Veritat i mentida Paradox Truthfulness and falsehood |
| id |
ES_01a8cbd7b0641d8e5f44a136ade4fa18 |
|---|---|
| oai_identifier_str |
oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/106661 |
| network_acronym_str |
ES |
| network_name_str |
España |
| repository_id_str |
|
| spelling |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the SoritesOms Sardans, SergiParadoxaVeritat i mentidaParadoxTruthfulness and falsehood[eng] In this dissertation I examine some of the most relevant proposals of common solutions to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do that, I present first a definition of what a paradox is so that, with this at hand, I can characterize in detail what should we expect from a common solution to a given collection of paradoxes. Next, I look into the reasons we might have to endorse a common solution to a group of paradoxes and some consequences are drawn with respect to Vann McGee's and Graham Priest's proposals to cope with both the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes, In the next chapters, three authors are examined in some detail. First, Jamie Tappenden's account is judged inappropriate, specially in the case of the Liar paradox. With respect to the Sorites, it is showed to be at least as problematic as Supervaluational approaches. Second, Paul Horwich's epistemicist proposal is examined with a special focus on the treatment of the Liar paradox. Horwich's account about how to construct his theory of truth is formalized and critically discussed with the use of a fixed-point construction. In the last chapter, I introduce and discuss some logics based on the work of Hartry Field that use two conditionals in a language with a truth predicate and vague predicates[cat] En aquesta tesi examino algunes de les propostes mes importants de solució comuna a les paradoxes del Mentider i la Sorites. Per tal de fer-ho, introdueixo, primer, una definició de la noció de paradoxa i, amb ella, caracteritzo en detall que cal esperar d'una solució comuna a un grup de paradoxes. A continuació, considero quines són les raons que podem tenir per tal d'adoptar una solució comuna a una col·lecció de paradoxes i extrec algunes conclusions respecte les propostes de Vann McGee i Graham Priest per fer front al Mentider i la Sorites. En els tres capítols següents, examino tres autors en detall. Primer, rebutjo la proposta de Jamie Tappenden per inapropiada, especialment en el cas del Mentider. Pel que fa a la Sorites, mostro que la teoria que Tappenden defensa es, al menys, tan problemàtica com les propostes superavaluacionistes. En segon lloc, examino la teoria epistemicista de Paul Horwich, amb especial atenció a la seva aplicació al mentider. A traves d'una construcció de punt fixe, formalitzo i discuteixo críticament la proposta de Horwich sabre com construir la seva teoria de la veritat. En l'últim capítol, introdueixo i discuteixo algunes lògiques, basades en les propostes de Hartry Field, que usen dos condicionals en llenguatges amb un predicat de veritat i predicats vagues.Universitat de BarcelonaMartínez Fernández, José, 1969-García-Carpintero, ManuelUniversitat de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia2016info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/106661http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399925Tesis Doctorals - Departament - Filosofiareponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaIngléscc-by, (c) Oms, 2016http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1066612026-05-27T06:46:51Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| title |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| spellingShingle |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites Oms Sardans, Sergi Paradoxa Veritat i mentida Paradox Truthfulness and falsehood |
| title_short |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| title_full |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| title_fullStr |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| title_full_unstemmed |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| title_sort |
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Oms Sardans, Sergi |
| author |
Oms Sardans, Sergi |
| author_facet |
Oms Sardans, Sergi |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Martínez Fernández, José, 1969- García-Carpintero, Manuel Universitat de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Paradoxa Veritat i mentida Paradox Truthfulness and falsehood |
| topic |
Paradoxa Veritat i mentida Paradox Truthfulness and falsehood |
| description |
[eng] In this dissertation I examine some of the most relevant proposals of common solutions to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do that, I present first a definition of what a paradox is so that, with this at hand, I can characterize in detail what should we expect from a common solution to a given collection of paradoxes. Next, I look into the reasons we might have to endorse a common solution to a group of paradoxes and some consequences are drawn with respect to Vann McGee's and Graham Priest's proposals to cope with both the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes, In the next chapters, three authors are examined in some detail. First, Jamie Tappenden's account is judged inappropriate, specially in the case of the Liar paradox. With respect to the Sorites, it is showed to be at least as problematic as Supervaluational approaches. Second, Paul Horwich's epistemicist proposal is examined with a special focus on the treatment of the Liar paradox. Horwich's account about how to construct his theory of truth is formalized and critically discussed with the use of a fixed-point construction. In the last chapter, I introduce and discuss some logics based on the work of Hartry Field that use two conditionals in a language with a truth predicate and vague predicates |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016 |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| format |
doctoralThesis |
| status_str |
publishedVersion |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106661 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399925 |
| url |
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106661 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399925 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
Inglés |
| language_invalid_str_mv |
Inglés |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
cc-by, (c) Oms, 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| rights_invalid_str_mv |
cc-by, (c) Oms, 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ |
| eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universitat de Barcelona |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universitat de Barcelona |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Tesis Doctorals - Departament - Filosofia reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB instname:Universidad de Barcelona |
| instname_str |
Universidad de Barcelona |
| reponame_str |
Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| collection |
Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv |
|
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
| _version_ |
1869402599587840000 |
| score |
15,301603 |