A characterization of pairwise dictatorial approbatory social welfare functions
[EN] This paper defines approbatory social welfare functions. They are the natural counterpart of Arrovian social welfare functions when the expression of preferences is accompanied by a common choice of “approved” alternatives in a consistent manner. First, we count the number of consistent prefere...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión enviada para evaluación y publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Salamanca (USAL) |
| Repositorio: | GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/163896 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/163896 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Ranking Approval Social welfare function Voting Dictatorship 6310.11 Bienestar Social |
| Sumario: | [EN] This paper defines approbatory social welfare functions. They are the natural counterpart of Arrovian social welfare functions when the expression of preferences is accompanied by a common choice of “approved” alternatives in a consistent manner. First, we count the number of consistent preference-approval profiles (the domain of approbatory social welfare functions). Then we show that pairwise dictatorial behaviors are characterized by unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, a replication of Arrow’s characterization of dictatorships for this restricted version of the preference-approval model defined by Brams and Sanver in 2009. |
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