We can't have no satisfaction

Many authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two models. The first impo...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Marques, Teresa
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/147064
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147064
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Filosofia del llenguatge
Conflicte (Psicologia)
Discussió
Anàlisi del discurs
Philosophy of language
Conflict (Psychology)
Discussion
Discourse analysis
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spelling We can't have no satisfactionMarques, TeresaFilosofia del llenguatgeConflicte (Psicologia)DiscussióAnàlisi del discursPhilosophy of languageConflict (Psychology)DiscussionDiscourse analysisMany authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two models. The first imposes a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, and the second depends on the impossibility of Joint Satisfaction. This paper assesses whether either of the two conditions can account for conflicting attitudes. First, it argues that Subjective Rationality cannot account for intersubjective conflicts. Second, it presents putative counterexamples to Joint Satisfaction. The counterexamples arise on the assumption that the attitudes are first personal. The paper then explores two alternatives: nihilism about attitudinal conflicts, and dropping the assumption that the relevant attitudes are first-personal states. Embracing nihilism would be devastating for expressivists and other non-cognitivists. But dropping the assumption on which the counterexamples to Satisfaction depend requires a new account of the conative attitudes expressed in value discourse. The paper concludes by pointing to an alternative.Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos2016info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/147064Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.173.07Filosofia Unisinos, 2016, vol. 17, num. 3, p. 308-314https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.173.07info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415cc-by (c) Marques, Teresa, 2016http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1470642026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv We can't have no satisfaction
title We can't have no satisfaction
spellingShingle We can't have no satisfaction
Marques, Teresa
Filosofia del llenguatge
Conflicte (Psicologia)
Discussió
Anàlisi del discurs
Philosophy of language
Conflict (Psychology)
Discussion
Discourse analysis
title_short We can't have no satisfaction
title_full We can't have no satisfaction
title_fullStr We can't have no satisfaction
title_full_unstemmed We can't have no satisfaction
title_sort We can't have no satisfaction
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Marques, Teresa
author Marques, Teresa
author_facet Marques, Teresa
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Filosofia del llenguatge
Conflicte (Psicologia)
Discussió
Anàlisi del discurs
Philosophy of language
Conflict (Psychology)
Discussion
Discourse analysis
topic Filosofia del llenguatge
Conflicte (Psicologia)
Discussió
Anàlisi del discurs
Philosophy of language
Conflict (Psychology)
Discussion
Discourse analysis
description Many authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two models. The first imposes a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, and the second depends on the impossibility of Joint Satisfaction. This paper assesses whether either of the two conditions can account for conflicting attitudes. First, it argues that Subjective Rationality cannot account for intersubjective conflicts. Second, it presents putative counterexamples to Joint Satisfaction. The counterexamples arise on the assumption that the attitudes are first personal. The paper then explores two alternatives: nihilism about attitudinal conflicts, and dropping the assumption that the relevant attitudes are first-personal states. Embracing nihilism would be devastating for expressivists and other non-cognitivists. But dropping the assumption on which the counterexamples to Satisfaction depend requires a new account of the conative attitudes expressed in value discourse. The paper concludes by pointing to an alternative.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147064
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147064
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.173.07
Filosofia Unisinos, 2016, vol. 17, num. 3, p. 308-314
https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.173.07
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by (c) Marques, Teresa, 2016
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by (c) Marques, Teresa, 2016
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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