Human Rights and Their Metaphysical Foundational Problems
This article will analyze the thought of Professor Robert Alexy, that related to the metaphysical foundation of human rights, where the central thesis is developed that the validity of human rights is based on the very existence of rights as a moral norm Therefore, in a descriptive way, we will begi...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Ecuador |
| Institución: | Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar |
| Repositorio: | Revista Comentario Internacional |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:revistas.uasb.edu.ec:article/4222 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uasb.edu.ec/index.php/comentario/article/view/4222 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | fundamentación metafísica normas morales derechos humanos derecho validez sistemas foundation metaphysics moral norms human rights law validity systems |
| Sumario: | This article will analyze the thought of Professor Robert Alexy, that related to the metaphysical foundation of human rights, where the central thesis is developed that the validity of human rights is based on the very existence of rights as a moral norm Therefore, in a descriptive way, we will begin with the characterization of human rights, at least from their main particularities, to the dual metaphysical foundation of rights proposed by the professor from Kiel, then mention will be made of the objections that are presented to this metaphysical foundation, where the analysis of the objections made will be contrasted with the presentation of the scheme of the system of norms proposed by Hans Kelsen, in this sense, the debate would focus on the proposal of the metaphysical foundation of human rights within of the system of moral norms guided by the static principle of norms, which would include its elements of validity and enforceability in the field of its creation and operation, therefore, the present work is concluded by arguing that the contradictions and implications of the metaphysical foundation of human rights do not reach legal systems guided by the dynamic principle of norms, but is applicable and enforceable in the systems of moral norms. |
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