Frege’s puzzle and the a priori
In this paper I offer a reconstruction of Stavroula Glezakos’ claim that there is no Frege’s puzzle. I identify the main theses doing the philosophical work in her argument and examine a possible difficulty: her argument may have the consequence of ruling out all a priori knowledge. I try to dispel...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | Costa Rica |
| Institución: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21320 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21320 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | frege’s puzzle a priori knowledge fregean senses frege glezakos puzzle de frege conocimiento a priori sentidos fregeanos |
| Sumario: | In this paper I offer a reconstruction of Stavroula Glezakos’ claim that there is no Frege’s puzzle. I identify the main theses doing the philosophical work in her argument and examine a possible difficulty: her argument may have the consequence of ruling out all a priori knowledge. I try to dispel the difficulty and restore her argument. |
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