A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties

This paper is inspired by Thomas Pogge’s book World Poverty and Human Rights. Pogge explores the moral implications of the extent and severity of world poverty for us —the citizens of affluent countries. In doing so, he assumes the familiar distinction between positive and negative duties. As Pogge...

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Autor: von Kriegstein, Hasko
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2009
País:Colombia
Institución:Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Repositorio:Repositorio UN
Idioma:español
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.unal.edu.co:unal/28630
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/28630
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/18678/
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Pogge
Poverty
Negative Duties
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spelling A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative dutiesvon Kriegstein, HaskoPoggePovertyNegative DutiesThis paper is inspired by Thomas Pogge’s book World Poverty and Human Rights. Pogge explores the moral implications of the extent and severity of world poverty for us —the citizens of affluent countries. In doing so, he assumes the familiar distinction between positive and negative duties. As Pogge puts it: There are two ways of conceiving such poverty as a moral challenge to us: we may be failing to fulfill our positive duty to help persons in acute distress; and we may be failing to fulfill our more stringent negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit from the unjust impoverishment of others. (Pogge 2008 203, italics in original). While negative duties are acknowledged by a vast majority of Western ethical and political thinkers, positive duties are often contested as unjustified or supererogatory. Pogge, in his attempt to argue that eradication of world poverty is morally required, goes on to argue that we are failing to fulfill our negative duties towards the global poor. Thus, his argument is designed to convince adherents of a lot of different schools of thought that action against poverty is necessary. Relying for a start on a common sense understanding of the distinction between negative and positive duties, I will explore Pogge’s argument. Then, by looking at various accounts of how the positive/negative distinction could be spelled out, I will show that Pogge’s argument fails to establish that the citizens of the affluent countries are violating their negative duties towards the global poor. However unfortunate a result for Pogge’s argument that might be, it is not devastating for the case of duties towards the poor. As I will scrutinize the aforementioned accounts of the positive/negative distinction it will turn out that this distinction cannot be upheld. We therefore need a different account of duties, one that will do away with the artificial sharp line between negative and positive duties. I will gesture towards such an account at the end of my paper and suggest that on such an account we will have reason to accept that we do have a duty to help the global poor.Universidad Nacional de Colombia2019-06-26T10:21:29Z2019-06-26T10:21:29Z2009Artículo de revistainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/28630http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/18678/spahttp://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/saga/article/view/14570Universidad Nacional de Colombia Revistas electrónicas UN Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de FilosofíaSaga - Revista de Estudiantes de FilosofíaSaga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) 0124-8480von Kriegstein, Hasko (2009) A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties. Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) 0124-8480 .Derechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de ColombiaAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositorio UNinstname:Universidad Nacional de Colombiainstacron:Universidad Nacional de Colombia2023-11-11T04:21:32Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
title A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
spellingShingle A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
von Kriegstein, Hasko
Pogge
Poverty
Negative Duties
title_short A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
title_full A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
title_fullStr A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
title_full_unstemmed A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
title_sort A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv von Kriegstein, Hasko
author von Kriegstein, Hasko
author_facet von Kriegstein, Hasko
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Pogge
Poverty
Negative Duties
topic Pogge
Poverty
Negative Duties
description This paper is inspired by Thomas Pogge’s book World Poverty and Human Rights. Pogge explores the moral implications of the extent and severity of world poverty for us —the citizens of affluent countries. In doing so, he assumes the familiar distinction between positive and negative duties. As Pogge puts it: There are two ways of conceiving such poverty as a moral challenge to us: we may be failing to fulfill our positive duty to help persons in acute distress; and we may be failing to fulfill our more stringent negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to contribute to or profit from the unjust impoverishment of others. (Pogge 2008 203, italics in original). While negative duties are acknowledged by a vast majority of Western ethical and political thinkers, positive duties are often contested as unjustified or supererogatory. Pogge, in his attempt to argue that eradication of world poverty is morally required, goes on to argue that we are failing to fulfill our negative duties towards the global poor. Thus, his argument is designed to convince adherents of a lot of different schools of thought that action against poverty is necessary. Relying for a start on a common sense understanding of the distinction between negative and positive duties, I will explore Pogge’s argument. Then, by looking at various accounts of how the positive/negative distinction could be spelled out, I will show that Pogge’s argument fails to establish that the citizens of the affluent countries are violating their negative duties towards the global poor. However unfortunate a result for Pogge’s argument that might be, it is not devastating for the case of duties towards the poor. As I will scrutinize the aforementioned accounts of the positive/negative distinction it will turn out that this distinction cannot be upheld. We therefore need a different account of duties, one that will do away with the artificial sharp line between negative and positive duties. I will gesture towards such an account at the end of my paper and suggest that on such an account we will have reason to accept that we do have a duty to help the global poor.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009
2019-06-26T10:21:29Z
2019-06-26T10:21:29Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
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format article
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/28630
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/18678/
url https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/28630
http://bdigital.unal.edu.co/18678/
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/saga/article/view/14570
Universidad Nacional de Colombia Revistas electrónicas UN Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía
Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía
Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) 0124-8480
von Kriegstein, Hasko (2009) A bad argument for a good case: pogge on poverty and negative duties. Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) Saga - Revista de Estudiantes de Filosofía; Vol. 10, núm. 20 (2009) 0124-8480 .
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Derechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Derechos reservados - Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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