Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia

We examine individual harvesters' preferences for government enforcement of a quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. We develop a model of Nash behavior by identical risk neutral harvesters to explain individual equilibrium preferences for enforcement of an efficient harve...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Vélez, M.A., Stranlund, J., Murphy, J.
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2012
País:Colombia
Institución:Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/46866
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46866
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912000948
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Common pool resources
Field experiments
Enforcement
Regulation
Voting
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spelling Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in ColombiaVélez, M.A.Stranlund, J.Murphy, J.Common pool resourcesField experimentsEnforcementRegulationVotingWe examine individual harvesters' preferences for government enforcement of a quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. We develop a model of Nash behavior by identical risk neutral harvesters to explain individual equilibrium preferences for enforcement of an efficient harvest quota. If the quota is not enforced well, we demonstrate that individual harvesters will always prefer increased enforcement¿either increased monitoring or increased penalties¿of the quota. We conduct a test of this theoretical result with data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted in artisanal fishing communities in three regions of Colombia. Subjects were given the opportunity to express their preferences for enforcement by voting on two levels of enforcement of a harvest quota, with and without communication. The two enforcement strategies involved the same probability that the government would audit individual harvesters, but differed in the level of the penalty for noncompliance. Contrary to theory, individuals voted for the lower inefficient penalty about 80% of the time and groups implemented this weaker enforcement strategy over 90% of the time. Giving subjects the opportunity to vote on the enforcement strategy did not lead to more efficient harvests, nor did allowing subjects to communicate before voting.Facultad de Administración2020-10-01T16:46:09Z2020-10-01T16:46:09Z2012Artículo de revistainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaTexthttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTp. 185-192application/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1992/46866http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912000948instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/reponame:Séneca: repositorio Uniandesinstname:Universidad de los Andesinstacron:Universidad de los AndesengAl consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf22022-06-02T14:03:46Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
title Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
spellingShingle Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
Vélez, M.A.
Common pool resources
Field experiments
Enforcement
Regulation
Voting
title_short Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
title_full Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
title_fullStr Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
title_full_unstemmed Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
title_sort Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Vélez, M.A.
Stranlund, J.
Murphy, J.
author Vélez, M.A.
author_facet Vélez, M.A.
Stranlund, J.
Murphy, J.
author_role author
author2 Stranlund, J.
Murphy, J.
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Common pool resources
Field experiments
Enforcement
Regulation
Voting
topic Common pool resources
Field experiments
Enforcement
Regulation
Voting
description We examine individual harvesters' preferences for government enforcement of a quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. We develop a model of Nash behavior by identical risk neutral harvesters to explain individual equilibrium preferences for enforcement of an efficient harvest quota. If the quota is not enforced well, we demonstrate that individual harvesters will always prefer increased enforcement¿either increased monitoring or increased penalties¿of the quota. We conduct a test of this theoretical result with data from framed common pool resource experiments conducted in artisanal fishing communities in three regions of Colombia. Subjects were given the opportunity to express their preferences for enforcement by voting on two levels of enforcement of a harvest quota, with and without communication. The two enforcement strategies involved the same probability that the government would audit individual harvesters, but differed in the level of the penalty for noncompliance. Contrary to theory, individuals voted for the lower inefficient penalty about 80% of the time and groups implemented this weaker enforcement strategy over 90% of the time. Giving subjects the opportunity to vote on the enforcement strategy did not lead to more efficient harvests, nor did allowing subjects to communicate before voting.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012
2020-10-01T16:46:09Z
2020-10-01T16:46:09Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46866
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912000948
instname:Universidad de los Andes
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/
url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46866
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912000948
identifier_str_mv instname:Universidad de los Andes
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
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dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv p. 185-192
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Facultad de Administración
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Facultad de Administración
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