The complementary role of affect-based and cognitive heuristics to make decisions under conditions of ambivalence and complexity
Little is known about the interplay between affective and cognitive processes of decision making within the bounded rationality perspective, in particular for the debate on adaptive decision making and strategy selection. This gap in the knowledge is particularly important as affect and deliberation...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | Colombia |
| Institución: | Universidad de los Andes |
| Repositorio: | Séneca: repositorio Uniandes |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/47084 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/1992/47084 https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0206724 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Complementary role Affect-based Cognitive heuristics Ambivalence and complexity |
| Sumario: | Little is known about the interplay between affective and cognitive processes of decision making within the bounded rationality perspective, in particular for the debate on adaptive decision making and strategy selection. This gap in the knowledge is particularly important as affect and deliberation may direct preferences in opposite directions. How do decision makers solve such dissonance? In this paper, we address this question by exploring the use of integral affect as a choice heuristic in comparison with and in conjunction to ¿take the best,¿ and weighted addition of attributes (WADD). We operationalize theories of reliance on affect in choice through a "Take the emotionally best" algorithm. Its predictive power is experimentally tested against other models, including mixed-sequential cognitive/affective procedures. We find that individual decisions are better predicted by a sequential combination of "Take the emotionally best" and "Take the best" with a slight dominance of the former. Conditions of cognitive/affective ambivalence, low discrimination ability and high complexity provide the cognitive architecture where such blended choice strategies predict decisions more precisely. This implies that reliance on integral affect may precede the use of cognitive cues following an ecological rationality perspective rather than supporting a kind of competition between affect and cognition as implied in current literature. |
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