Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile

How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Livert, Felipe, Gainza, Xabier, Mogollon, Raymundo
Tipo de documento: artigo
Estado:Versão publicada
Data de publicação:2021
País:Chile
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.anid.cl:10533/45827
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/10533/45827
Access Level:Acceso aberto
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spelling Mogollon, RaymundoGainza, XabierLivert, Felipe202110.1016/j.electstud.2021.102377https://hdl.handle.net/10533/45827http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from ChileLivert, FelipeGainza, XabierMogollon, Raymundo2023-06-29T23:42:00Z2023-06-29T23:42:00Z2021How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.COVID0419COVID0419virtual::77399-1https://hdl.handle.net/10533/45827instname: ANIDreponame: Repositorio Digital RI2.010.1016/j.electstud.2021.102377info:eu-repo/grantAgreement//COVID0419info:eu-repo/semantics/dataset/hdl.handle.net/10533/93477https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379421000950info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessElectoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from ChileElectoral StudiesArticuloinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticulohttps://hdl.handle.net/10533/45827http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb12894d9b6-c345-4f9f-a165-e6399c414fc7virtual::77399-12894d9b6-c345-4f9f-a165-e6399c414fc7virtual::77399-1ORIGINALElectoral incentives and distributive politics- Gainza, Livert, Mogollón.pdfElectoral incentives and distributive politics- Gainza, Livert, Mogollón.pdfapplication/pdf1000124https://repositorio.anid.cl/bitstreams/d6a7f8d6-5c69-4eee-b011-4b5642bf5e83/downloadaf539c96e40351407a5a1e46e519f90dMD5110533/45827oai:repositorio.anid.cl:10533/458272023-12-04 15:10:37.571https://repositorio.anid.clRepositorio ANIDaletelier@anid.cl
dc.title.en.fl_str_mv Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
dc.title.journal.en.fl_str_mv Electoral Studies
title Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
spellingShingle Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
Livert, Felipe
title_short Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_full Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_fullStr Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_full_unstemmed Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
title_sort Electoral incentives and distributive politics in young democracies: Evidence from Chile
dc.creator.en.fl_str_mv Livert, Felipe
Gainza, Xabier
Mogollon, Raymundo
author Livert, Felipe
author_facet Livert, Felipe
Gainza, Xabier
Mogollon, Raymundo
author_role author
author2 Gainza, Xabier
Mogollon, Raymundo
author2_role author
author
description How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.issued.en.fl_str_mv 2021
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-29T23:42:00Z
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