Essential Stability for Large Generalized Games
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to perturb...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | tesis de maestría |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2012 |
| País: | Chile |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.anid.cl:10533/236124 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/10533/236124 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Ciencias Sociales Economía y Negocios |
| Resumo: | We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to perturbations on parameters. As an application of our results, we show that essential stability can provide a rationale for electoral participation of politically engaged individuals. |
|---|