ROBUST ETHICAL REALISM AND THE MORAL COINCIDENCE PROBLEM
I present an objection to robust ethical realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts with normative import. I argue that if we combine robust ethical realism with a traditional conception of morality, according to which persons are especially relevant from a moral point of view, th...
| Autor: | |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPEL) |
| Repositorio: | Dissertatio - Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.ufpel:article/21673 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/21673 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Normative realism moral realism non-naturalism persons coincidence. Realismo normativo realismo moral não-naturalismo pessoas coincidência. |
| Sumario: | I present an objection to robust ethical realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts with normative import. I argue that if we combine robust ethical realism with a traditional conception of morality, according to which persons are especially relevant from a moral point of view, the result is that there is a remarkable coincidence between the content of normative facts and the kind of beings that actually exist. On the one hand, the normative facts single out persons as anespecially relevant kind of being and, on the other hand, persons happen to exist. This match amounts to a coincidence because, according to robust ethical realism, normative facts cannot explain why there are persons and the fact that there are persons cannot explain why the normative facts are what they are. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem. Although there are important similarities between this objection and other objections to normative realism that appeal to remarkable coincidences (such as Street’s evolutionary debunking argument and Bedke’s cosmic coincidence argument), I argue that the moral coincidence poses a different problem for robust ethical realism. |
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