Do the referents of proper names have essential sortal properties?
According to the default view, the direct reference theory and essentialism are independent. Jubien (2009), however, claims that we apply proper names to objects with essential sortal properties (which he calls “categories”) and cease to apply them if the objects lose these properties. The objective...
| Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2022 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repository: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/40327 |
| Online Access: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/40327 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Proper Names Sortal Essentialism Direct Reference Producers Metonymy Nombres propios Esencialismo sortal Referencia directa Productores Metonimia Nomes próprios Essencialismo sortal Referência direta Produtores Metonímia |
| Summary: | According to the default view, the direct reference theory and essentialism are independent. Jubien (2009), however, claims that we apply proper names to objects with essential sortal properties (which he calls “categories”) and cease to apply them if the objects lose these properties. The objective of this paper is to defend this thesis. First, I will argue that proper names are usually used to refer to objects which possess socially relevant kinds of sortal properties. The linguistic community determines the relevant sortal property of the referent through the division of linguistic labor. Then, I will present a defense against the objections of plausible counterexamples in two steps. First, showing that in many cases the change of sortal property is only apparent. Secondly, I will describe the mechanism of metonymy, which explains why we use homonymous names for different, however, contiguous objects. Finally, I will employ a modification of Putnam’s Principle of the Benefit of the Doubt to deal with the problem of radical error, i.e., cases in which the linguistic community is entirely deceived concerning the sortal property of the referent. The results cast a deeper light on the conceptual scheme underlying our ordinary language naming practices. |
|---|