Leibniz e Kant: princípio de razão suficiente e o “incondicionado”
This article aims to show the relation between the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) and the idea of pure reason known as “unconditioned” based on the thoughts of Leibniz and Kant. Starting from Boehm’s thesis, which states that the Kantian rationalism depends on the refutation of the ontological...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2024 |
| Country: | Brasil |
| Institution: | Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
| Repository: | Revista Dois Pontos (Curitiba. Online) |
| Language: | Portuguese English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/64859 |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.ufpr.br/doispontos/article/view/64859 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Leibniz Kant principle of sufficient reason unconditioned causality ontological argument. princípio de razão suficiente incondicionado causalidade argumento ontológico |
| Summary: | This article aims to show the relation between the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) and the idea of pure reason known as “unconditioned” based on the thoughts of Leibniz and Kant. Starting from Boehm’s thesis, which states that the Kantian rationalism depends on the refutation of the ontological argument, we build our analysis by discussing the following points: i) the PSR is the principle that, in the first place, indicates an unconditioned as possible; ii) the Leibniz’s PSR appears in Kant’s philosophy under the name of “supreme principle of pure reason”; iii) in both philosophers it is required the self-sufficiency of the unconditioned, and iv) which is the nomological status of the PSR? After discussing these points, we take a stand for Boehm’s interpretation and Kant’s critique off the PSR, concluding that this principle is not a constitutive principle of reality but a merely regulative principle of reason in the experience. |
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